There was a time in Nigeria when darkness was not just the absence of light. It was policy.
For decades, we lived with a power sector that was state-owned, state-run, and state-failed. Bills came without light. Promises came without megawatts. And hope came with a generator’s roar.
That changed in 2013.
Under President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, Nigeria did what many called impossible: we privatised the power sector. We broke up the monolith called NEPA/PHCN and handed generation and distribution to private hands. The critics have been loud ever since. But the facts are louder. And the facts say this: privatisation did not fail. It started the only real power story Nigeria has ever had.
This is the story of the GENCOS. The story of risk, capital, and courage. And it is a story that must be told correctly, because to misunderstand it is to condemn 200+ million Nigerians to darkness again.
Before 2013, let us be honest about where we were.
Generation hovered dangerously low. At many points, the national grid could barely do 0 megawatts per hour of sustainable, bankable generation from a system that was meant to power Africa’s largest economy. Not because there was no gas. Not because there were no turbines. But because the system was broken from the inside.
PHCN was a bureaucracy, not a business. There was no incentive to collect revenue. No incentive to maintain plants. No incentive to invest. Workers were paid whether they worked or not. Vandalism was normal. Losses were normal. Darkness was normal.
Nigerians had accepted that “up NEPA” was a prayer, not a plan.
Then came privatisation. Not as an experiment. As an emergency.
What happened under President Jonathan was not backdoor dealing. It was the opposite.
The Jonathan administration, through the Bureau of Public Enterprises and the National Council on Privatisation, ran what global institutions still call one of the most transparent asset sales in Nigeria’s history.
Here is how it worked: no one needed to “know anyone in power.” The process was technical, financial, and open. You bid based on capacity. Your balance sheet. Your technical plan. Your ability to pay.
Let me give you one example that silences every rumor: Dangote Group — the biggest conglomerate in Africa — showed up 5 minutes late for the bidding process. Five minutes. And they were locked out. No calls. No exceptions. No “big man” treatment.
If Dangote could be turned back at the door, then the process was real.
There was no bribery. There was no settlement. It was simply based on capacity. The companies that won were the ones that could prove they had the money, the expertise, and the stomach to take on Nigeria’s biggest headache.
That is why today, the GENCOS are not government boys. They are investors. They put down real money.
Let’s kill another myth: “They collected power for free.”
No. They didn’t.
Every year, GENCOS pay $20 million USD as concession fees annually to the Federal Government. That’s just the entry fee to keep operating the assets.
On top of that, they pay:
Corporate taxes to FIRS
Royalties where applicable
CSR to host communities — building schools, clinics, roads, and youth programs in places where government has not reached
Just like the telecommunications sector that was privatised in 2001, the power privatisation came with obligations. And just like telecoms, it is the reason we moved from 500,000 landlines to over 200 million mobile lines.
We did not “dash” power to anyone. We sold it. And Nigerians are now the shareholders, because the service is meant to serve them.
Before 2013: system collapse was monthly. Tariffs were political. Investment was zero.
After 2013:
Capacity increased. For the first time, we had private capital in plants that were rotting. Turbines that had been down for 10 years were brought back to life.
Accountability entered. A GENCOS CEO can be fired for poor performance. A PHCN GM could not.
Transparency entered. The market now has rules, contracts, and regulators. It’s not perfect, but it exists.
Yes, we still have challenges. Gas supply. Transmission bottlenecks. Tariff shortfalls. Vandalism. We are not in Dubai yet.
But to say “privatisation failed completely” is to lie with data.
It is like planting a seed, watering it for 10 years through drought, and then saying “the tree is small, so farming doesn’t work.” The tree is alive. That is the miracle.
Recently, Senator Ben Murray Bruce said privatisation failed completely. With respect, that narrative does not match reality.
Senator Bruce is a respected voice. He built Silverbird. He understands business. But on this, the facts do not support him.
You cannot call something a “total failure” when:
Generation moved from near 0MW to peaks of over 5,000MW post-privatisation
Private investors injected billions of dollars that government did not have
We now have a framework where performance can be measured, penalized, and improved
Did we expect 24/7 light in 2015? Yes. Were we naive to think so? Maybe.
Failure is not when you make progress with problems. Failure is when you make no progress at all.
PHCN was failure. Privatisation is work in progress.
To undo it now is to go back to 0MW. To go back to a system where no one is responsible and everyone is to blame.
Here is the truth we must now face: the biggest threat to the progress made since 2013 is not lack of money. It is lack of synergy.
There are growing complaints and concerns within the sector about the high-handedness of the present leadership of the Bureau of Public Enterprises, BPE.
Stakeholders — investors, GENCOS, and technical partners — are alleging a management style that leans more toward confrontation than collaboration. Instead of convening, the tendency now is to dictate. Instead of problem-solving, there are accusations of fabrications and actions driven by personal vendetta rather than national interest.
This is dangerous.
Power sector reform is not a one-man job. It is a relay. President Jonathan started the race with transparency. President Tinubu is now running the next leg with bold reforms: subsidy removal, market liberalization, and renewed investor confidence.
But for President Tinubu’s work to succeed, we need the institutions in the middle to act as bridges, not barriers.
What the sector needs today is synergy and cooperation.
The BPE was created to midwife privatisation and monitor concessions, not to micromanage or intimidate operators who are already risking billions. When the regulator and the operator are fighting, the only loser is the Nigerian who is waiting for light.
Fabrications, media leaks, and strong-arm tactics do not generate a single megawatt. Meetings, data-sharing, payment plans, and joint problem-solving do.
President Tinubu has made it clear that his administration is pro-business and pro-results. To align with that vision, the BPE must drop the posture of high-handedness and embrace partnership. The GENCOS are not enemies of government. They are co-investors with government in the Nigeria project.
If we get this synergy right, the concession fees will be paid faster. The plants will run better. The grid will be more stable. If we get it wrong, we will spend the next 4 years in court and on Twitter, while the lights stay off.
Let’s talk about the people in the room.
GENCOS took assets that were 30-40 years old. Assets with no maintenance records. Assets in communities with no security. And they said, “We will fix it.”
They borrowed in dollars. They hired engineers. They are paying communities. They are paying government. And they are still being asked to sell power at tariffs that do not fully reflect cost, while absorbing inflation, gas price hikes, and forex volatility.
Yet they stay. Because they believe in Nigeria.
This is not charity. This is business. And business only works when we tell the truth about it.
We will not insult your intelligence by saying all is well. It is not.
For privatisation to deliver 24/7 power, we must:
Fix the gas-to-power value chain so GENCOS can get fuel consistently
Strengthen transmission so generated power can reach homes
Allow cost-reflective tariffs with protection for the poor, so investors can reinvest
Enforce payment discipline across government MDAs and consumers
Restore institutional synergy — especially between BPE, NERC, and GENCOS — so policy is not sabotaged by personality clashes
The foundation was laid under Jonathan. The building is not finished. But you do not burn the foundation because the roof is leaking. You fix the roof. And right now, part of fixing the roof means fixing how we talk to each other.
Conclusion: Don’t Kill the Light to Curse the Darkness
Nigeria’s power story did not start with privatisation. But the only chapter with hope started there.
The Jonathan privatisation was transparent. It was competitive. It was painful, but necessary. It brought in people who had no political godfather, only capacity. It brought in money government didn’t have. It brought in a system where someone can now be held accountable.
The GENCOS are not the problem. They are part of the solution.
To those who say “scrap it all,” I ask: what is your alternative? Back to PHCN? Back to 0MW? Back to darkness as policy?
What we need now is not more quarrels. What we need is synergy. When BPE, GENCOS, government, and communities work together, President Tinubu’s Renewed Hope agenda for power will be easier to deliver.
Nigeria deserves light. And light will only come when we choose cooperation over conflict.
Empower people. Hear people. Build Nigeria.
And building Nigeria means protecting what works, and fixing how we work together.
*Keem Abdul, a public relations guru, publisher and writer, hails from Lagos. He can be reached via text +2348038795377 or Akeemabdul2023@gmail.com
