Mnangagwa regime must serve Zimbabweans, not foreign guests: the optics of Harare’s “clean-up operations”

Tendai Ruben Mbofana

In recent weeks, the Mnangagwa administration has gone full throttle in sweeping street vendors off the pavements of the capital, Harare, under a clean-up operation codenamed “Chenesa Harare.”

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The heavy-handed drive has escalated sharply, extending to the forcible eviction of unlicensed operators along First Street to enforce a strict “pedestrians only” standard.

Shortly after, the government issued an immediate directive demanding that all unlicensed roadside car dealerships cease operations forthwith.

Officially, the state claims this campaign is designed to restore urban order and return the capital to its long-lost “Sunshine City” status.

On the surface, such measures might strike a casual observer as reasonable or long overdue.

Harare—much like urban centers across the country—had indeed become nearly impassable.

Informal vendors choked shop corridors, while unmanaged litter turned downtown areas into sprawling refuse dumps.

Formal, tax-paying businesses faced immense pressure, undercut by cheaper goods often smuggled right onto their doorsteps.

Restoring structural order to the city is a legitimate necessity.

However, genuine urban renewal is not what is taking place in Harare today.

The Zimbabwean government rarely acts out of pure benevolence for its citizens.

Had urban management been a genuine priority, the state would not have ignored the decay of city centers for decades, settling instead for periodic, aggressive skirmishes between municipal police and informal traders without ever delivering a sustainable plan.

To understand why this sudden enforcement blitz is happening now, one must look to history.

This heavy-handed play is an established pattern, stretching back to October 1991 when Harare hosted the 12th Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM).

With international dignitaries and Queen Elizabeth II slated to attend, the state acted swiftly to present a sanitized image.

In the months preceding the summit, authorities forcibly evicted thousands of low-income residents, vendors, and unhoused individuals from Mbare and surrounding informal settlements.

Loaded onto trucks, the displaced were dumped at Hatcliffe Extension and Porta Farm—far out of sight of visiting delegates and journalists.

Commonwealth leaders toured carefully manicured routes, entirely unaware of the social crisis swept under the rug.

Fourteen years later, in 2005, the regime executed “Operation Murambatsvina,” flattening informal homes and livelihoods across urban centers.

According to United Nations estimates, that campaign directly left roughly 700,000 people homeless or destitute, affecting 2.4 million citizens indirectly.

Today, the exact same strategy is playing out for the exact same reasons.

Harare is preparing to host the 25th COMESA Summit from October 19 to 22, 2026, at the New Parliament Building in Mount Hampden, where Zimbabwe will officially assume the rotating COMESA Chairmanship for the 2026–2027 term.

These clean-up operations have nothing to do with long-term urban governance and everything to do with political optics.

The state is once again seeking to conceal domestic realities behind a veneer of functionality for visiting regional leaders.

The tactic mirrors the approach taken ahead of the 44th SADC Summit in August 2024, when authorities selectively resurfaced only the transit corridors earmarked for foreign dignitaries, leaving the rest of Harare’s road network riddled with severe potholes.

The impending summit also contextually illuminates the recent house demolitions along the airport route, targeted primarily because they were viewed as visual liabilities along delegate transit paths.

Sweeping informal traders from the streets does not address the underlying structural drivers of informal commerce.

Despite repeated clearouts in 1991, 2005, and now 2026, the underlying economic engine—widespread structural unemployment—remains unaddressed.

In 1991, national unemployment stood at roughly 15%, with informal traders representing 27% of business activity (around 350,000 people).

Today, setting aside revised statistical frameworks from ZimStat that classify informal trading as formal employment, realistic estimates place actual unemployment above 85%.

Modern estimates indicate the informal sector comprises roughly 76.9% of economic activity, involving over 2.5 million people.

This contrast exposes the government’s core priorities: a focus on cosmetic presentation over sustainable economic reform.

Chasing vendors off pavements and demolishing structures requires minimal policy depth, whereas generating formal employment and providing legal housing frameworks demands structural accountability.

The administration must reorient its priorities toward the actual living conditions of Zimbabwean citizens rather than temporary impressions staged for foreign dignitaries.

Superficially masking economic distress does not secure livelihoods, fund education, or provide shelter.

The public requires structural reform and economic stability, not short-term optical management.

• *Tendai Ruben Mbofana is a social justice advocate and writer. Please feel free to contact him on +263715667700 ot *

  mbofana.tendairuben73@gmail.com