COMAC may be about to bifurcate the aviation market with 'good enough' jets, sufficient when paired with broader economic and geopolitical concerns.
While many analysts may look at the COMAC C919 and other series aircraft through an economic lens and assess their ability to compete with Airbus and Boeing, this article will argue that the more helpful lens is geopolitical. It will argue that COMAC aircraft are state-backed political efforts and do not fit neatly into free-market analysis. Aircraft like the C919 don't need to be as fuel-efficient as the Airbus A320neo or the Boeing 737 MAX. They do not necessarily need to be the best aircraft available; they need to be good enough to provide a viable alternative to Western aircraft, particularly when political, financial, or strategic considerations favor Chinese suppliers.
It is plausible that COMAC will take a central role in the bifurcation of the world's aviation market. If the world order continues to be strained, or starts to unravel, COMAC's export potential would likely become increasingly associated with the broader economic and geopolitical relationships between China and the export country. Here is why, under this scenario, the COMAC series doesn't necessarily need to compete with Airbus and Boeing in the classic free economy sense.
The West, including the United States individually, could likely end the production of C909 and C919 should it want to. This is not just theoretical. In 2022, the West imposed crippling sanctions on Russia, and production of its Sukhoi Superjet and MC-21 ground to a halt. Russia had enough accumulated spare parts on hand to assemble eight more Superjets after the sanctions went into effect, but that was it (until 2026).
In May 2025, the Trump administration temporarily suspended export licenses for CFM International LEAP-1C engines to China. At the time, it was estimated that China had stockpiled around 60 to 100 LEAP-1C engines, which would have been enough to produce 30 to 50 C919 aircraft. This would have been enough to have covered its 2025 production plan, but would have run out in 2026. The C919 uses a large range of Western components, including life support systems, avionics, landing gear, anti-collision systems, and more.
If the US were to cut the C919 off completely, it is unclear which system would be the first bottleneck; it may or may not be the engine. But this would likely be a temporary measure. China is developing its own analogues, including the AECC CJ-1000A turbofan, which will likely enter service in the early 2030s. It is likely Western sanctions would lead to a hiatus, not a permanent stop of COMAC commercial aircraft production, similar to that playing out in Russia.
As of mid-2026, the orders for the COMAC C909 and C919 are overwhelmingly domestic. China has the world's second-largest domestic aviation industry, one that is easily big enough to support and develop regional and narrowbody airliners. China-based airlines do not operate in the same competitive environment as the United States and elsewhere. Chinese airlines operate in an environment where it becomes problematic not to purchase the C919.
As explained by the think tank, the Center for Strategic & International Studies, in the podcast entitled "How Firms Serve the Party-State," Chinese companies, including the airlines, are expected to serve the interests of Beijing's policies and aims. This plausibly means that if the central Chinese policy is to grow a domestic aviation industry, then its airlines are required to support it.
| COMAC aircraft | Type/approx. capacity | Status | Competitors | |---|---|---|---| | C909 (formerly ARJ21) | Regional jet; 78–97 seats | In service | Embraer E175/190 | | C919 | Narrowbody, 158-192 seats | In service | A319neo, A320neo, MAX 7, MAX 8 | | C929 | Widebody 280-290 seats (baseline) | In development | A330neo, A350-900, 787-9, 787-10 | | C939 | Larger widebody, 400-500 seats | Preliminary design | A350-1000, 777-8, 777-9 |
By June 2026, it is estimated that the orders by Chinese airlines for the C919 now exceed 1,000 aircraft, with Cirium estimating it had passed that number in 2024. This massive insular market ensures the C919 and other programs can get off the ground and mature. The contrast is stark with other programs like the Bombardier CSeries. While the Canadian government did provide some assistance to developing the aircraft, it could not, and would not, provide a massive insular environment to guarantee thousands of sales.
The world of fighter jet sales is acutely intertwined with geopolitics. While it may not be as dramatic in the commercial sector, it is still there. In 2025, Qatar Airways (owned by the State of Qatar) chose to announce the purchase of 210 widebody jets from Boeing, valued at $96 billion, during U.S. President Donald Trump's visit to Doha in May 2025. This took place in the context of pledging to buy large amounts of US weapons, the ex-Qatari 747-8 gift to the US, and the US later granting Qatar NATO Article 5-like defense protection.
It is not possible to isolate any of these (and other) elements, as they all took place in a particular geopolitical context. While the details are not specified, Air Cambodia announced in July 2026 that it was exercising its operations for ten aircraft, bringing its total order to 20 regional C909s, making it the first bulk purchase of the C909 by a foreign flag carrier. Air Cambodia is also ordering 20 Boeing 737 MAX narrowbody jets.
It is worth noting that Cambodia has an exceptionally close relationship with China. It is the source of a large amount of Chinese investment and is the recipient of Chinese military equipment. This is made more important in the face of Cambodia's recent border clashes with its much larger neighbor, Thailand.
The decision to purchase C909s may be fully economical, but it is also possible it is part of a larger suite of dealings. In principle, China could offer a discount on the aircraft, preferential financing, bundle it with military purchases, or many other possible combinations of incentives. Unless the terms of this particular transaction are disclosed, it is impossible to determine how much weight such considerations may or may not have carried.
One of the biggest issues facing COMAC is obtaining regulatory approval for its aircraft in major overseas markets. COMAC is likely to find a more receptive regulatory environment in a number of developing markets, particularly where governments have close relations with China or where airlines have strong commercial incentives to purchase Chinese aircraft.
This has been done in some countries in Southeast Asia. But while granting type certificates may ostensibly be focused on safety, it is also bound up in geopolitics. It is very possible that Japan, especially given the deteriorating relations with China, will not grant the certificate in the medium term.
Perhaps more important is India. Discussions about the BRICS and the 'Global South' gloss over the fact that China and India are in intense rivalry. India has long blocked Chinese companies like Huawei and TikTok. For five years, it all but denied mainland Chinese visas to India and banned direct flights (lifted in 2026). For India's defense establishment, China is increasingly regarded as the country's principal long-term strategic challenge (outpacing Pakistan).
India is important as it is one of the world's fastest-growing aviation markets with the largest growth potential. It is very possible that India will not grant the type certificates. Perhaps a more doable market for COMAC is Europe. But this is also partly contingent on the development of Sino-European relations vis-à-vis the United States. Without Europe, COMAC's export market would be significantly hindered.
The United States has historically been willing to use FAA aviation regulation and market access as part of broader foreign-policy and economic-security policy. Under the current conditions, and with the trajectory of geopolitical relations with China, it seems unlikely the FAA will issue a type certificate to COMAC in the foreseeable future. Not only is the United States the world's largest market, but it also has a huge amount of influence on the aviation agencies of other countries.
For example, the aviation authorities of countries like Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and others are heavily influenced by the decisions of the FAA (as well as EASA). Even if Canada were to diverge from the US and permit them to fly in its airspace, it's unclear how appealing they would be. In the context of Canada, a large part of narrowbody routes are routes to the United States, which would not be possible. This is also true for Mexico.
The FAA may not have direct regulatory approval over other countries, but its influence should not be underestimated. It can also be noted that while regional C909s and narrowbody C919s do have strong domestic and semi-international use cases in regions like China domestically and Southeast Asia, this becomes much more difficult for widebody aircraft like the upcoming C929 and C939. These regulations will be more difficult for those intercontinental aircraft.
While no one can predict the future, it is plausible that COMAC could fracture the global aviation industry. There are partial parallels with the Cold War (Soviet vs Western airliners) and even Russia developing its own domestic russified airliners today. But it will likely be different. The Cold War created binaries; countries either had Soviet aircraft or Western aircraft.
Additionally, there was a large qualitative gap between Soviet and Western aircraft. But this time the split will likely be fuzzier. Some markets (e.g., China) may fully transition to COMAC series aircraft, while others (e.g., the US) may remain exclusively Western-airliner markets. But there are likely to be many others, such as Cambodia, Indonesia, and Pakistan, that will purchase and operate both.
There may also be a performance gap, but that is likely to be narrower than the Cold War and has the potential to narrow further over time. The quality gap could spike if the US/Europe were to restrict COMAC to Western components via sanctions. But while that could have a large, damaging impact in the short term, by some time in the 2030s, China may have developed its own competitive substitutes.
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