Somalia and the ‘Bilateralisation’ of The War Against Al-Shabaab and ISIS

Somalia’s campaign against Al-Shabaab is increasingly characterised by bilateral troop deployments, Somali-led ground operations and external military support. This model offers tactical advantages, but questions remain over coordination, sustainability and the future role of the African Union mission.

Recent operations in Somalia’s Lower Shabelle, together with an increased tempo of US airstrikes, highlight the growing importance of bilateral military arrangements alongside the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).

In March 2026, Somali National Army forces, supported by AUSSOM’s Ugandan contingent and international partners, announced the recapture of Mubarak and Daarusalaam in Lower Shabelle. Subsequent operations in April targeted additional insurgent positions, with AUSSOM reporting air cover and coordinated ground action. These operations demonstrate the continuing importance of cooperation between Somali forces, AU contingents and external partners.

The United States has maintained a significant counterterrorism air campaign. On 17 October, US Africa Command (AFRICOM) confirmed an airstrike targeting Al-Shabaab near Dhooble Airport in southern Somalia. AFRICOM’s published register recorded 88 strikes in Somalia during 2026 at the time of writing, targeting both Al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia. This illustrates the scale of US involvement, although it does not establish that American air assets supported every successful ground operation.

Türkiye has also expanded its military engagement with Somalia through training, defence cooperation and the deployment of F-16 fighter aircraft, publicly demonstrated in April 2026. However, their presence does not establish that Turkish combat aircraft supported the specific operations in Lower Shabelle.

Bilateral troop deployments represent another significant development. According to The EastAfrican, Uganda is assessed to have between 4,000 and 6,000 troops deployed under bilateral arrangements, in addition to its allocated AUSSOM contingent of approximately 4,500. Ethiopia is also reported to have around 5,000 bilateral troops in Somalia, alongside its 2,500-person AU allocation. These figures are estimates rather than independently verified totals.

The distinction matters. AUSSOM provides a multilateral framework for supporting stabilisation and Somali security forces. Bilateral deployments operate through national arrangements with the Somali government. Although they may complement the AU mission, their command relationships, operational priorities and support arrangements are not necessarily identical.

This emerging pattern has been described as the ‘bilateralisation’ of the war against Al-Shabaab. It suggests a shift towards national troop deployments and direct military assistance operating alongside the formal AU framework.

International involvement extends beyond conventional military support. Photographs reported by The EastAfrican following operations in Lower Shabelle showed Somali and Ugandan troops alongside personnel from Bancroft Global Development, a contractor involved in training and mentoring Somali forces. Its presence illustrates the proximity of specialist support to frontline operations, although it does not establish a combat role.

The operational advantages of this model are apparent. Bilateral forces can supplement available manpower, while air support can disrupt insurgent positions and create opportunities for ground forces to advance. Intelligence, training and logistics can further improve operational effectiveness. Recent successes suggest these elements can be mutually reinforcing when effectively coordinated.

Nevertheless, the precise relationship between bilateral deployments, US strikes and Turkish military activity requires further evidence. The presence of several international partners does not establish a joint command structure, nor does the timing of airstrikes and ground advances prove direct causation.

There are also strategic risks. Reliance on external air power and foreign troops may produce tactical gains without delivering lasting security. Holding recovered territory requires secure supply routes, capable Somali forces, functioning local administration and sufficient public confidence to prevent insurgents from returning.

AUSSOM’s future remains central to this debate. Its authorised strength must be distinguished from the number of troops actually deployed and available for operations. Egypt’s participation was already being prepared in February 2026; any further expansion should be assessed against confirmed decisions rather than reported proposals.

The central question is not whether bilateral deployments should replace multilateral cooperation, but how they can reinforce a coherent, Somali-led security strategy. Greater operational flexibility and external support may generate battlefield gains, but their longer-term value will depend on whether those gains endure, coordination remains effective and Somali institutions can assume lasting responsibility for security.

The experience of 2026 points to the growing importance of bilateral military arrangements in Somalia’s campaign against Al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia. The model has potential, but tactical success should not be confused with strategic victory. Its ultimate test is whether international support builds sustainable Somali security capabilities rather than enduring dependence on external forces.

Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Freddie Grounds