State police: Stakeholders raise fresh concerns

•As 24 Houses of Assembly pass State Police Bill, questions persist over funding, collision with federal police, abuse by govs, others •States brace up to enact own police laws

**The **on-going national discourse on decentralising policing in Nigeria’s federal system reflects a renewed effort to re-engineer the country’s security architecture. Arguments for and against state police have resurfaced intermittently for decades, but as complex, localised security threats escalate across the geopolitical zones, the demand for decentralised policing has acquired unprecedented urgency.

On Tuesday, this reform initiative took a significant step forward when the Presidential Working Group on the National Policing Bill, led by the Chief of Staff to the President, Hon. Femi Gbajabiamila, disclosed that it had submitted the draft National Policing Bill, 2026, alongside 29 consequential bills, to the Ministry of Justice for legislative drafting, review and validation.

This momentum builds on the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (Sixth Alteration) Bill, 2026, which was transmitted to the 36 State Houses of Assembly on September 16 by the Clerk of the National Assembly, Kamoru Ogunlana. The proposed amendment seeks to alter Section 214 of the Constitution to dismantle the monopoly of centralised command and establish a dual policing structure comprising a Federal Police Service and autonomous State Police Services.

The primary argument for state policing rests on the necessity of local intelligence, geographic familiarity and community-embedded operations. Retired General Ishola Williams strongly endorsed decentralised, bottom-up structures: “Policing is bottom-up, not top-down. The current security of the states is, however, top-down. You need a crime intelligence and criminal investigation agency at the federal level to support state agencies in handling criminals, including bandits and kidnappers. Therefore, we do not need a centralised federal police force. A paramilitary mobile unit could then back up state police forces. The push for state police is entirely justified.”

Williams’ submission broadens the debate beyond policing. His argument is that Nigeria’s security problems are fundamentally linked to governance structure and concentration of responsibility at the federal level.

“I have always said that insecurity is not our problem. Nigeria is secure but Nigerians are not safe. And Nigerians can be safe if the government can design a new security architecture. The best responder for our safety is at the local government and state level. If you are safe in your hometown, if you are safe in your state, you are safe in Nigeria. What I want to hear is the endorsement of state police. The Nigeria Police should cease to exist. Policing should be left to state and local governments. The Federal Government should be responsible for crime intelligence and criminal investigation. That is what we need, not state police and Nigeria Police. With that, the new security architecture is complete.”

However, moving state police from a political proposal to operational reality presents formidable legal, political and financial hurdles. Experts say this dual structure creates as much risk as opportunity. Legislation is not implementation, and Nigeria’s reform history shows that good intentions without detailed transition plans often create new problems. To avoid administrative chaos or political weaponisation of local forces, they argue a rigorous, phased transition is vital.

Yet, as legislative adoption accelerates, the core question shifts. It is no longer merely whether Nigeria requires state police, but whether states can establish a system that enhances security without exposing citizens to political persecution, human rights abuses and institutional decay. This transition must be evaluated on four dimensions: the constitutional process and transition roadmap, the political calculations of key actors, state financial and managerial capacity, and institutional safeguards against weaponisation.

Constitutional process and legislative pathway

Amending Section 214 represents one of the most complex legislative undertakings in Nigeria’s post-1999 democratic experience. The section stipulates that “there shall be a police force for Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigeria Police Force, and subject to the provisions of this section no other police force shall be established for the Federation or any part thereof.” Dismantling this exclusive federal mandate requires navigating Section 9(2) of the Constitution. The mechanics demand not only a two-thirds supermajority in both the Senate and House of Representatives but also ratification by at least 24 State Houses of Assembly. This two-tier requirement was designed to prevent unilateral structural changes by the central government. As at the last count, 24 Houses of Assembly are said to have reportedly passed the State Police Bill, leaving 12 other states to complete the voting process.

As of the last count, 24 Houses of Assembly have reportedly passed the State Police Bill, leaving 12 others to complete the voting process. The Houses that have passed the Bill include Adamawa, Delta, Edo, Kwara, Nasarawa, Ogun, Osun, Oyo, Plateau, Rivers, Taraba, Zamfara, Enugu, Anambra, Imo, Ekiti, Kebbi, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Benue, Cross River, Abia, Yobe and Kaduna.

The remaining 12 State Houses of Assembly that have not yet approved the Bill are Lagos, Ondo, Ebonyi, Kogi, Niger, Borno, Gombe, Bauchi, Jigawa, Katsina, Kano and Sokoto.

“Having met the constitutional threshold of two-thirds approval by State Assemblies, the State Police Bill can be said to be on course. While the remaining 12 states have one week to take a final decision, the Ministry of Justice is expected to return the validated draft Bills to the Working Group on or before Friday, 30 October 2026. The Working Group will then give the validated Bills final consideration before presenting them to Mr President, thereby concluding its mandate,” Gbajabiamila said.

Beyond constitutional text, the drafting process at the Ministry of Justice is expected to harmonise the Sixth Alteration Bill with the National Policing Bill and the 29 consequential bills governing operational boundaries, jurisdictional overlaps and joint operations. Without precise delineation, experts say, conflict will inevitably arise between federal officers under the Inspector-General of Police and state officers reporting to State Commissioners of Police. They argue that the process must clearly define which offences fall under state competence, such as burglary, public order and traffic violations, and which remain federal, such as treason, cybercrime, inter-state trafficking and counter-terrorism.

The bill also requires each House of Assembly to enact its own State Police Service law and obtain certification that national standards are met before operations begin. This is intended to prevent a chaotic rush to launch. It also creates a reconstituted National Police Council to coordinate policy and cooperation.

However, experts have flagged procedural contradictions. Jackson Olalekan-Ojo faulted the timing of the legislative process relative to executive planning, noting that a presidential committee on state police was still sitting when both chambers passed the bill. He stressed that execution is the real test: “Policy formulation is not our main challenge in Nigeria, policy implementation is.”

Governors, lawmakers, and power dynamics

The progress of the bill cannot be isolated from the political calculations of governors and lawmakers. Governors are nominally “Chief Security Officers,” but Section 215(4) allows a Commissioner of Police to refer a governor’s directive to the President, rendering governors virtually powerless over deployment in their domains.

For governors, state police represents a recovery of executive authority, enabling swift responses to communal clashes and banditry without clearance from Abuja. Conversely, opposition figures harbour deep reservations rooted in history. During the First Republic (1960–1966), Native Authority Police in the North and Local Government Police in the West were deployed by ruling parties to suppress opposition, intimidate voters and rig elections.

Olalekan-Ojo highlighted these anxieties: “As many as 32 states in the federation are currently controlled by the ruling party. How will they avoid abusing state police, especially now that the President is pushing for it and the National Assembly is driving it forward? Will they not use state police to intimidate the opposition or tamper with election logistics? Nonetheless, if personnel are thoroughly vetted and officers are properly paid, I believe it could be the right move.”

Analysts expect a few Houses of Assembly to stall or debate the bill over cost and political weaponisation. Olalekan-Ojo put it bluntly: “Will officers be paid like civil servants? Will their salaries come as and when due? Will they be used as political thugs? Will they be used to witch-hunt opponents? Those are the questions we must answer. If these questions are not properly answered, we will be enacting a law that produces lawlessness.”

Funding and equity risks

While politics dominates public attention, financial sustainability poses the most formidable hurdle. Establishing, equipping, training and paying a state police force is a major fiscal commitment requiring investment in academies, forensic labs, arms, intelligence hardware, logistics, remuneration, pensions and insurance.

Though federal allocations have increased, severe disparities persist. Only a few states like Lagos, Rivers and Ogun with high internally generated revenue have the fiscal space to sustain modern outfits. The majority rely heavily on FAAC allocations and struggle to meet basic payroll obligations.

Security expert Patrick Agbambu warned: “You cannot arm a man and then owe him two or three months’ salary. You will create anarchy.” He also questioned the proposed 60-40 split of existing personnel: “According to the IGP, the existing police will be split 60-40. The federal police will retain 40 per cent, while 60 per cent will go to the states. If the federal government pays a policeman N100,000, will Ondo or Anambra be willing, or able, to pay the same?” His recommendation was that the federal government cedes a percentage of revenue allocation to states.

Olalekan-Ojo echoed the inequality risk: “Each state knows its funding capacity. Lagos may recruit 200,000 officers. Oyo may recruit 50,000. The numbers may differ, but salaries and other remuneration should be uniform. I do not want a situation where rich states are well policed while poor states are not, forcing criminals to migrate to poorly policed states.” To prevent a two-tier system, he proposed a “state police equalisation fund” to support poorer states. He warns that such inequality itself becomes a security threat.

Agbambu flagged structural duplication: “Many states already have security outfits. In the South-West, you have Amotekun in several states, while Lagos has the Neighbourhood Watch. If we now create another state police, we will be duplicating structures. Will Amotekun be merged into the state police? For me, we are not getting it right.”

On recruitment, Olalekan-Ojo outlined a rigorous process: “The Nigeria Police should handle it, with the DSS involved in profiling and the military supporting training. The DSS must conduct background checks first. After that, there should be a proper interview, jointly conducted by the police and DSS. Only those who scale through should be recruited. We must change their mentality and orientation. We must re-indoctrinate them. If that is done, we can say we have the right personnel.”

He cautioned against rushing: “We should be looking at nine to ten months before this can take off. It is like a seed. You cannot plant it today and expect fruit in a week.”

Scepticism and alternative proposals

Despite the momentum, some experts question the premise. Agbambu argues for decentralisation within the existing structure, allowing Deputy Inspectors-General and Assistant Inspectors-General to function effectively in their zones.

“I don’t think creating a state police is what we need if we are serious about solving insecurity. Establishing state police will not solve our problem. Let us not be deceived. State police have not worked in any country,” he argues, adding “there is a need to take the police closer to the people. But is state police the solution? No.”

In his view, funding and welfare, not legal structure, are the root causes of failure: “The biggest challenge facing the Nigeria Police today is not directives from the IGP. It is remuneration, tools to work, welfare, and morale. Will state police solve these? I doubt it.”

Also speaking vehemently against the state police idea is a former presidential candidate of the National Conscience party (NCP), martin Onovo.

In a recent interview with Sunday Sun, he noted: “The State Police idea is a bad idea at this time. The adoption of State Police is part of the artificial and deceitful schemes of the APC government to try to cover their sponsorship of insecurity and terrorism in Nigeria. There are State Police commands in every State in Nigeria. If they lack men, we can recruit more men. If they are poorly trained, we can retrain them. If they are poorly equipped, we can equip them adequately. If they are poorly motivated, we can motivate them properly.

“The State Police idea is a bad idea at this time. The adoption of State Police is part of the artificial and deceitful schemes of the APC government to try to cover their sponsorship of insecurity and terrorism in Nigeria. There are State Police commands in every state in Nigeria. If they lack men, we can recruit more men. If they are poorly trained, we can retrain them. If they are poorly equipped, we can equip them adequately. If they are poorly motivated, we can motivate them properly.

“The idea of a State Police is a very bad idea at this time for many reasons; it is clearly a wasteful duplication of police services. The fear of abuse especially for the persecution of political opponents is clearly valid. The killing of an NBA branch chairman in Anambra State some years ago was by a state policing organisation.

The likelihood of conflicts with federal security agencies is very high especially with the current ethical ambience in Nigeria. The threat to members of the public by a poorly disciplined state police organisation is very high. The danger of retaliation against members of the public if state governments owe the men is very high. State Police will introduce additional 37 different policing standards in the 36 States and the FCT. Travelling in Nigeria will require compliance with the different policing standards in all the different states. The leading ethical security experts in Nigeria have opposed the idea.

“Also, it is illogical to expect that a poorly funded, less trained, less equipped and less

experienced State Police can perform better than the better funded, better trained, better equipped and more experienced Nigeria Police Force.”

Onovo also insisted that some state governors would turn the state police into a terror force against political opponents.

“We have seen the Benue State government use thugs to obstruct the movement of Mr Peter Obi, the presidential candidate of the NDC. We can infer that if they had a state police, they would use the state police to claim that Mr Peter Obi had no police

permit. We cannot trust intolerant, insecure, failed, corrupt and tyrannical governors with State Police. I restate that the killing of an NBA branch chairman in Anambra State some years ago was by a state policing organisation. I say no to state police.”

Safeguards against abuse

To ensure the dual structure enhances safety rather than degrading civil liberties, stakeholders insist on robust, non-negotiable safeguards. Despite Section 17(7) of the bill forbidding state police from targeting political critics, concerns remain.

To insulate forces from executive overreach, appointment, stakeholders say, promotion and disciplinary control must not rest solely with governors. Each state must establish an independent State Police Service Commission comprising representatives of the judiciary, civil society, human rights bodies, the Nigerian Bar Association and retired law enforcement professionals. Appointment of the State Commissioner of Police should be recommended by the commission and confirmed by a two-thirds majority of the House of Assembly, with removal restricted to proven misconduct verified by an independent judicial panel.

Additionally, they insist that federal enabling legislation must mandate independent Civilian Oversight Boards at state and national levels, with statutory authority to receive complaints, investigate human rights violations, inspect detention facilities and initiate prosecution against erring officers. Only through such safeguards can Nigeria navigate this critical transition.

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