2027: Why Gov Ahmed Aliyu Is Coasting Home To Victory

If today were February 6, 2027—the date fixed by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) for the governorship election in Sokoto State and in the 28 other states—one could almost predict the result before the first vote is cast. By 4 pm, Governor Ahmed Aliyu would have been announced the winner and would be preparing to receive his certificate of return.

The good part is that the opposition candidates would have little reason to wonder what had hit them, because they had seen the electoral demolition coming, punch after punch, like Muhammad Ali’s legendary opponents who knew the “good night punch” was coming but could do nothing to stop it.

The signs have been visible for more than a year that the election is increasingly looking like a walkover. Whatever doubts there might have been have been further confirmed by the crisis in the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the African Democratic Congress (ADC), coupled with the daily decamping of opposition politicians into the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC).

But what is happening in Sokoto State goes beyond the familiar pre-election movement of politicians. It is a broader political realignment, further reinforced by a combination of Governor Aliyu’s performance, the strength of his party and the growing perception that his opponents face an uphill task in offering any challenge.

The question, therefore, is not simply why opposition politicians have been moving to the APC in droves. The more consequential question is why they have increasingly found the political family of Governor Ahmed Aliyu and Senator Aliyu Wamakko attractive. The reasons are not difficult to discern.

First is the humility and accessibility of both men, who have remained closely connected to the people and placed considerable value on personal relationships, consultation and grassroots engagement.

The second, and perhaps equally important factor is good governance. In Sokoto State, government has become much more visible in its impact. This is significant because good governance was one of the major issues that continues to feature prominently in the criticism of the Aminu Tambuwal administration.

The Aliyu administration has therefore been able to turn governance into a political advantage by pointing to projects and its interventions in critical sectors.

For opposition politicians considering their political future, the attraction is not just the strength of the APC political structure; it is the growing awareness that the administration has a record they can’t campaign against.

There are striking similarities between the current political realignment and the developments that preceded the 2007 governorship election.

At the time, Senator Aliyu Magatakarda Wamakko’s political influence had continued to expand despite efforts by the Attahiru Bafarawa administration to frustrate his ambition. His coalition eventually carried him to victory.

Nearly two decades later, Governor Ahmed Aliyu, his political son, is generating a similar political momentum. The parallel is striking: Wamakko, whose political movement delivered victory in 2007, is today the APC leader in Sokoto.

Working together, the two men have masterminded some of the most significant defections, turning their political partnership and father-and-son relationship into a formidable team that continues to dominate the politics of the state.

In July 2026, Sa’idu Ubandoma, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) governorship candidate whom Governor Ahmed Aliyu defeated in the 2023 election, defected to the APC.

The defection was a major strategic blow to the Aminu Waziri Tambuwal political camp and is one of the most consequential defections in Sokoto’s recent political history. As a former Commissioner for Finance and Secretary to the State Government under Tambuwal, he was one of the most prominent figures associated with the former governor’s political structure.

His departure therefore represented a significant loss of both political capital and credibility for the opposition. Although the opposition has sought to portray his defection as a reaction to losing the ADC governorship ticket to Manir Dan’Iya, that explanation falls short of the reality.

The ADC has been deeply fractured almost from its inception and is embroiled in multiple court cases, making it increasingly difficult to function as a credible vehicle for any serious political engagement.

Against this backdrop, Ubandoma’s decision to join the APC was an act of political pragmatism and, more importantly, his selflessness—putting the broader political interest of the state ahead of his personal ambition.

Thousands of ADC and PDP supporters have continued to defect to the APC, further weakening the opposition’s political base. Among the most significant is the defection from Goronyo, the political stronghold of Bashir Usman Gorau, the ADC member representing Gada/Goronyo Federal Constituency in the House of Representatives.

Such developments confirm that the realignment has penetrated deep into the grassroots. This is no longer simply a story of prominent politicians changing party labels; it is a broader movement involving political structures, local leaders and ordinary supporters reassessing their positions and moving towards where they believe the balance of power lies.

For many communities, the calculation is also practical: political alignment often determines access to influence, government attention and development. In politics, those who supported the party that won usually get priority attention from government.

The answer lies in something both simple and politically powerful: people can point to things that have changed. Since assuming office in May 2023, Governor Aliyu has anchored the projects and policies of his administration on a nine-point Smart Agenda covering education, healthcare, water supply, agriculture, security, youth empowerment, infrastructure, religious affairs and economic development.

Increasingly, that agenda is being judged not by what government says, but by what people can see and experience.

The administration’s record is so substantial that it can’t be measured. By early 2026, more than 350 projects had been completed across various sectors, representing a significant volume of physical development in less than three years.

Infrastructure provides perhaps the clearest example.

The government has undertaken extensive township and rural road construction, with more than 136 township roads completed by mid-2025 and with additional rural and urban roads ongoing. The Arkilla New Layout road network, for example, was completed at a cost of about ₦3.51 billion. More roads have subsequently been constructed to improve connectivity between farming communities and markets.

The importance of these projects goes beyond the roads themselves. In a predominantly agrarian state, roads determine how easily farmers can move their produce to the markets, how quickly people can reach health facilities and schools, and how businesses connect with their customers.

Education offers an even stronger illustration of the administration’s priorities.

The ₦758.7 billion 2026 budget allocated approximately ₦115.9 billion to education, while health received ₦122.73 billion. Together, the two sectors account for almost ₦239 billion, a significant indication of the administration’s emphasis on human capital and social services.

The education investment has also produced physical outputs. More than 1,175 classrooms have been constructed, while over 1,000 others have been rehabilitated, alongside the provision of furniture and learning materials and the reconstruction of major schools.

Healthcare carries a similar political significance.

With ₦122.73 billion allocated to health in the 2026 budget, the administration has placed the sector among its most important priorities.

The government has also reconstructed 160 primary healthcare centres across the state, procured critical life-saving equipment and installed solar power systems to improve the reliability of healthcare delivery, particularly in facilities where electricity supply has been a persistent constraint. Immunisation coverage has also improved, providing another measurable indication of progress in basic healthcare delivery.

For the people, however, the meaning of healthcare is ultimately simple: does a health facility function when they need it? In this regard, the difference between the Aliyu administration and the previous administration is, from the perspective of many residents, difficult to compare.

The combination of renovated facilities, functioning equipment, more reliable power and improved immunisation services has changed the experience of healthcare delivery in many communities.

Agriculture provides perhaps the most important economic dimension.

Sokoto remains an agrarian state, and the prosperity of many rural households depends directly on farming. The Aliyu administration has therefore continued to provide agricultural inputs, implements and mechanisation, including the procurement of tractors, while programmes such as NG-CARES and Ahmadu-CARES have provided additional interventions for vulnerable households, young people and women.

The same principle applies to workers and pensioners.

No serious assessment of Governor Aliyu’s administration can ignore the security situation.

Terrorism remains a major challenge, particularly in the eastern part of the state, but the administration’s response has gone well beyond rhetoric. Governor Aliyu has consistently maintained that terrorists and their collaborators cannot be appeased through negotiation, and has vowed that his administration will not negotiate with terrorists. That hardline position has been matched by sustained material support for the security agencies.

The state government has provided operational vehicles and other logistics to the military, police and other security agencies, while supporting the expansion of the security architecture in the state.

It has facilitated the establishment and development of a military base and an Air Force facility, strengthening the capacity of security forces to operate more effectively and respond faster to threats. In August 2026, for example, the government approved ₦1.75 billion for the procurement of 1,000 motorcycles to support operations against banditry.

Security remains unfinished business. The case for Aliyu’s re-election does not rest on the fact that every problem has been solved. It rests on a broader and more consequential fact that despite the enormous challenges confronting Sokoto, the state is moving in the right direction—and that the administration has demonstrated the determination, investment and capacity required to take it further.

That is where the opposition faces its own challenge.

The challenge before the opposition is not simply how to stop the defections; it is that it can’t offer voters itself as a compelling alternative. How can a house divided against itself credibly explain what it would do differently, how it would improve on the current administration’s record, or, more importantly, why voters would abandon a government whose projects and interventions are increasingly visible in their communities?

The defections are not necessarily the cause of Governor Aliyu’s growing political advantage. It’s the fact that three years into the Aliyu administration, governance has increasingly met their expectations.

The 2027 election is still more than five months away, and the election is increasingly becoming more of a referendum on Governor Ahmed Aliyu’s performance than a contest.

For Governor Ahmed Aliyu, the political momentum has created something increasingly valuable: time. With the opposition struggling to mount a credible challenge, the assurance of victory would allow him to look beyond the election itself and to begin planning early for a second term—one focused on consolidating it and setting a more ambitious agenda for Sokoto’s next phase of development.