
Foreign meddling in Nigeria’s elections is not new. Ahead of the 12 June election, there were reports that the late Libyan strongman Muammar Gaddafi had made a significant financial contribution to certain candidates.
In 2015, President Goodluck alleged threats from John Kerry, who was the US Secretary of State, and an orchestrated effort by Western powers to undermine his re-election.
And in 2023, both President Bola Tinubu, who was then only a candidate, and former Vice President Atiku Abubakar desperately lobbied the government of Joe Biden for support.
For 2027, foreign and regional leaders are desperately watching the election in Nigeria, including Romauld Wadagni, Faure Gnassingbe, Omar Tchiani, Mohamed Bazoum, Assimi Goita, Ibrahim Traore, Mahamat Deby, and even Western powers competing for influence in West Africa.
By law, it is the National Intelligence Agency that is responsible for monitoring the activities of foreign agents and operatives.
And as the election approaches, the NIA and its DG, Mohammed Mohammed, may have their hands full with the list of countries that feel they have a stake in the outcome of the polls.
Moahemmed himself is not new to operating in countries that engage in influence campaigns against their neighbours, such as North Korea, Pakistan, and Libya under Gaddafi.
But he faces challenges different from those of his predecessors, a different West Africa, and, on a personal level, a different work experience.
Uche Okeke Labored to form the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa. Olaniyi Oladeji spent time in Benin, and Ahmed Abubakar spent part of his life in Chad. Mohammed faces a fragmented region.
While former Army Chief Tukur Bururai has hinted at foreign interference, there is no evidence that Nigeria’s neighbours are looking to influence the outcome of the 2027 election.
But some are client states of Russia, and it is no secret that a number of them are quietly nursing hopes for political change.
Election interference could, however, take the form of influence campaigns on social media using bots and paid agents, hacking vulnerable systems, and building support for or against candidates through diplomatic means.
Directly or indirectly, President Tinubu has also inserted himself into the democratic processes of neighbouring countries such as Niger, Benin, Mali, and Burkina Faso.
In the case of Benin, Romuald Wadagni would not be President today if it weren’t for President Tinubu. Yet, the country’s economy, like Togo’s, has been battered by the Tinubu administration’s policies.
The “Tokunbo car” industry in Benin, which was fueled by demand from Nigeria, has collapsed. The unification of the Nairaa has also made goods and services cheaper in Nigeria, leaving Benin with little to export to its larger neighbour.
Leaders in the Sahel states have even bigger grievances than their economies. Their own misgivings have evolved into political stability and security, the entrenchment of military rule, and an end to historic colonial influence.