Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to Hear Appeals Directly from the LPDC

In the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Holden at Abuja

On Friday, the 26th day of June, 2026

Before their Lordships

Tijjani Abubakar

Emmanuel Akomaye Agim

Chidiebere Nwaoma Uwa

Moore Aseimo Abraham Adumein

Obande Festus Ogbuinya

Habeeb Adewale Olumuyiwa Abiru

Mohammed Baba Idris

Justices, Supreme Court

SC/481/2018

Between

Ben Mene-Ejegi Appellant

And

**1. Nigerian Bar Association Respondents **

**2. Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee **

(Lead Judgement delivered by Honourable Mohammed Baba Idris, JSC)

Facts

The Appellant, a legal practitioner practising in Warri, was arraigned before the LPDC on a two-count complaint of receiving the sum of N1,600,000.00 from a certain Tosan Olukpe by false pretence, as the purchase price for land situate at Ajah-Etan Close, Warri, which did not belong to him, and thereby conducted himself in an infamous manner contrary to Rule 1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners 2007, punishable under Section 12(1) of the Legal Practitioners Act (the “LPA”); and that he had refused to refund the said sum to Olukpe, despite repeated demands.

The case of the 1st Respondent was that sometime in 2010, Olukpe had purchased land in Warri from one Mr Akuya, and that during the execution of the Deed of Conveyance, which the Appellant prepared, the Appellant showed him a fishpond and other parcels of land at Ajah-Etan Close, representing that they belonged to him and were available for sale. Olukpe agreed to purchase a specified parcel for ₦1,600,000,00 and made payment to the Appellant, who acknowledged receipt on the letterheaded paper of his law firm. When Olukpe attempted to develop the land, he was informed that the Appellant wasn’t the owner, and was forcibly ejected from it. Consequently, he demanded a refund, which the Appellant resisted by offering an alternative parcel of land, which Olukpe rejected. Dissatisfied, Olukpe lodged complaints with the Police and the NBA.

Following investigations, the NBA found a prima facie case of professional misconduct against the Appellant, which led to the filing of the complaint before the LPDC.

In his defence, the Appellant contended that he had informed Olukpe that the land was family land still undergoing survey and not yet fully available for sale, and that despite this disclosure, Olukpe chose to pay the purchase price. He stated further that, the transaction was later disrupted when the land was reclaimed by the family, and that he made efforts to provide alternative land, which Olukpe refused. He contended that he was not accorded fair hearing during the investigation by NBA and admitted that the sum of N150,000.00 had been refunded to Olukpe by members of his family.

At the conclusion of the proceedings, the LPDC found both counts of the complaint proved, directed the Chief Registrar of the Supreme Court to strike the Appellant’s name off the Roll of Legal Practitioners maintained at the Supreme Court, and ordered him to refund the sum of N1,600,000.00 to Olukpe through the NBA within thirty days. Dissatisfied, the Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

During the course of the appeal, the Supreme Court raised, suo motu, the question whether an appeal can lie directly from a direction of the LPDC to the Supreme Court, in view of its decision in OSUJI v LPDC (2025) 17 NWLR (PT 2014) 317, to the effect that an appeal does not lie directly from a decision of the LPDC to the Supreme Court. Counsel for the parties were accordingly invited to, and did file supplementary briefs of argument, specifically addressing the jurisdictional question.

Issue for Determination

Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the LPDC?

Arguments

The Appellant submitted that jurisdiction is conferred by statute and traced the legislative history of appeals under the LPA, submitting that although earlier provisions provided for appeals to the Appeal Committee of the Body of Benchers, the Legal Practitioners (Amendment) Decree No. 21 of 1994 restored the right of direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Reliance was placed on OKIKE v LPDC (2005) 3-4 SC 49, where the Supreme Court held that it possesses jurisdiction to hear appeals directly from the LPDC, as Section 233(1) of the Constitution has not, either expressly or impliedly, ousted the jurisdiction of the court to hear such appeals.

The 1st Respondent, in its supplementary brief, referred to Sections 11 and 12(7) of the LPA and submitted that prior to the amendments to the LPA, appeals from the LPDC went to the Appeal Committee of the Body of Benchers; however, following the decision in LPDC v FAWEHINMI (1985) 2 NWLR (PT 7)**, several amendments were made to the LPA, culminating in the Legal Practitioners (Amendment) Decree No. 21 of 1994, which, by Section 10 thereof, amended Section 12(7) of the principal Act and restored a right of direct appeal from the LPDC to the Supreme Court. Reliance was also placed on ***OKIKE v LPDC (Supra), ***submitting that the Supreme Court has consistently exercised such jurisdiction in a plethora of cases.

The 2nd Respondent proffered arguments in alignment with the submissions above, and relying on AKINTOKUN v LPDC (2014) 13 NWLR (PT 1423) 1, where the Supreme Court examined the legislative history of the LPA and held that Decree No. 21 of 1994 has not been repealed and remains part of the extant laws of the Federation, and that although its provisions were not incorporated into the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, such omission does not amount to a repeal, by virtue of Section 2 of the Revised Edition (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria) Act 2007. Reliance was further placed on*** NWALUTU v NBA (2019) 8 NWLR (PT 1673) 174 AT 192, ***to the effect that an omission in a legislative compilation does not extinguish the legal force of a validly enacted statute that has not been expressly repealed.

Court’s Judgement and Rationale

Before delving into the issues submitted for the determination, the Supreme Court examined the propriety of raising an issue of jurisdiction suo motu and relied on various decisions to justify its stance, including ***EDEDE v A.G. FEDERATION & ANOR. (2025) LPELR-82109 (SC). ***Although the court can proceed to determine the issue raised suo motu without calling for an address from the parties where the issue relates to jurisdiction of the court, as in this case, nonetheless, Their Lordships allowed the parties to address the issue of jurisdiction, in deference to their constitutional right to a fair hearing. Even so, the court remarked that the parties did not make substantial submissions on the effect of Section 12(7) of the LPA vis-à-vis its compatibility with the appellate jurisdiction vested in the court by the Constitution.

On the issue of whether the direction of the LPDC is appealable to the Supreme Court, the court reiterated the settled principle of law that, courts are creatures of the Constitution or statute, and their jurisdiction is circumscribed by the enabling provisions creating them – MURTALA & ANOR v INEC & ORS (2024) LPELR-79942 (SC). The Supreme Court is a creation of the Constitution, and its jurisdiction, both original and appellate, is circumscribed by the provisions thereof. The court addressed its original jurisdiction under the Constitution, adding that by Section 232(2) of the Constitution, the National Assembly can confer additional original jurisdiction on the court by statute, except for criminal matters. And “it is manifest that the provision does not extend, either expressly or by implication, to appellate jurisdiction”.

The Supreme Court then proceeded to examine Section 233 of the Constitution, which confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to entertain appeals from the Court of Appeal, juxtaposing it with Section 240 of the Constitution, which, unlike Section 233, allows appeals from different courts such as the High Court of State, Federal High Court, and tribunals to the Court of Appeal. The court held that by reading Sections 233 and 240 of the Constitution side by side, it becomes manifest that, while the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal is expressly made subject to the provisions of the Constitution and extends to appeals from the courts and tribunals specifically enumerated therein, as well as such other courts or tribunals as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly, the provision relating to the Supreme Court is distinctly and more restrictively couched. Their Lordships reasoned that *the Constitution clearly contemplates a broader and more flexible appellate jurisdiction for the Court of Appeal, capable of statutory expansion, whereas the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is rigidly confined to appeals emanating from the Court of Appeal alone, with no corresponding constitutional allowance for enlargement by legislative intervention. *Applying the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the court held that while the National Assembly can expand the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal by statute, it does not have a corresponding power to confer an additional appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court. The court concluded that any statutory provision, including Section 12(7) of the LPA, which purports to confer a right of direct appeal from the LPDC to the Supreme Court, must yield to the supremacy of the Constitution, by virtue of Section 1(3) of the CFRN, 1999, such a provision is null and void to the extent of its inconsistency. The Court consequently held that Section 12(7) of the LPA, to the extent that it purports to confer a direct appeal from the LPDC to the Supreme Court, is inconsistent with Sections 233 and 240 of the Constitution and is therefore, void by virtue of Section 1(3) thereof.

Turning to its earlier decision on the point, the Supreme Court clarified that in*** OKIKE v LPDC,*** where the court had held that it possessed jurisdiction to entertain appeals directly from the LPDC, the constitutional implications of Sections 233(1) and 240 of the Constitution were not examined in that case, and that the exhaustive nature of the appellate jurisdiction of the court did not receive the detailed and holistic consideration the issue demanded. The court held that had the relevant provisions been considered together … the conclusion reached may well have been different.

Conscious of its position as the Apex Court whose decisions are final, the Supreme Court reiterated that it does not lightly depart from its previous decisions merely because another view appears preferable, and that the doctrine of stare decisis remains a cardinal pillar of our jurisprudence. The court held, however, relying on ***BUCKNOR-MACLEAN v INLAKS LTD (1980) 8–11 SC 1 ***and the approving adoption therein of the dictum of Lord Morris in CONWAY v RIMMER (1968) AC 910, that “though precedent is an indispensable foundation … there may be times when a departure from precedent is in the interest of justice and the proper development of the law”. The court restated the circumstances it may depart from a previous decision, as set out in AKINTOKUN v LPDC (Supra). And, that the power to depart from a previous decision is not dependent upon an invitation by Counsel, but inheres in its constitutional status as the final judicial authority in the Federation.

Applying the principles above, the court held that ***no Act of the National Assembly can enlarge its appellate jurisdiction beyond the limits expressly prescribed by the Constitution; ***accordingly, it overruled the decision in OKIKE v LPDC to the extent indicated. Consequently, the court held that ***it lacks jurisdiction to entertain a direct appeal from the direction of the LPDC, and that the only constitutionally recognised appellate route by which such an appeal may reach the Supreme Court, is through the Court of Appeal. ***The appeal was accordingly, held to be incompetent and struck out for want of jurisdiction.

Minority Opinion of Honourable Ogbuinya and Abiru, JJSC

In their dissenting opinion, the learned Justices observed that the parties were in agreement that the Supreme Court can exercise jurisdiction to hear an appeal flowing from a direction of the LPDC, all placing high premium on the earlier decision of the court in OKIKE v LPDC, where the full court interpreted Section 12(7) of the LPA alongside Section 233(1) of the Constitution and unanimously held that it possessed such jurisdiction. Quoting the pronouncement of Uwais, CJN (of blessed memory), it was decided that the Supreme Court “all along exercised jurisdiction in disciplinary matters pertaining to the conduct of legal practitioners” both before and after the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions, neither of which expressly or impliedly ousted that jurisdiction, and that the court jealously guards its jurisdiction, and does not readily allow it to be ousted.

Their Lordships acknowledged that, about eight years later, the full court, in ALADEJOBI v NBA (2013) 15 NWLR (PT. 1376) 66 and AKINTOKUN v LPDC (Supra), declined jurisdiction over appeals that arose from directions of the LPDC without passing through the Appeal Committee of the Body of Benchers, as prescribed by Sections 11(7) and 12(1) of the LPA. However, the Justices found, relying on the reasoning of Honourable Mohammed and Kekere-Ekun, JJSC, in AKINTOKUN v LPDC, that the issue determined in those two cases was distinct from, and did not overrule the issue determined in ***OKIKE v LPDC, ***which turned on a different statutory question and remains “extant and … good law for what it decided”. Their Lordships noted further that the subsequent decision of a five-man panel of the Supreme Court in OSUJI v LPDC relied on in the leading judgement, was itself anchored on the cases of ***ALADEJOBI ***and ***AKINTOKUN, ***and could not, on that account, be treated as having displaced OKIKE v LPDC.

Their Lordships embarked on an elaborate comparative survey of the doctrine of departure from previous decisions, drawing on cases including BUCKNOR-MACLEAN v INLAKS LTD (SUPRA) and BRONIK MOTORS LTD v WEMA BANK LTD (1983) NSCC VOL. 14, 226. Relating the conditions required thereof, Their Lordships opined that none of the conditions was satisfied. Accordingly, they opined that OKIKE v LPDC remains a valid and subsisting decision of the court, binding on all under the doctrine of *stare decisis,*and that the Supreme Court retains jurisdiction to entertain appeals directly from directions of the LPDC.

Appeal Struck Out by a Majority Decision of 5:2

Representation

P. Akpavie for the Appellant

Y.S. Bawa for the 1st Respondent

M. Adjeh for the 2nd Respondent

Reported by Optimum Publishers Limited, Publishers of the Nigerian Monthly Law Reports (NMLR)(An affiliate of Babalakin & Co.)