Together by Consent, apart by Agreement: Rethinking the Somalia–Somaliland Question

By Hussien Mohamed Yusuf

Listening to Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame respond to a question about Somaliland, I was struck by the political honesty of the argument he presented. As I understood his response, the possibility of a meaningful union rests with Hargeisa, while an agreed separation requires Mogadishu’s participation.

Put aside the emotions that usually surround this subject, and there is considerable wisdom in that observation. A union cannot become a living political reality without the willing participation of those expected to belong to it. Equally, a separation negotiated with the other party offers a stronger foundation for lasting peace and an orderly future relationship.

The Core Dilemma

This does not settle the competing historical and legal arguments. It does, however, identify the central political problem: neither side can secure a durable settlement simply by repeating its preferred conclusion. The article therefore proceeds from a simple but demanding proposition: unity requires the willing consent of Hargeisa, while any agreed separation requires serious engagement with Mogadishu. The sections that follow examine why that proposition matters historically, what it demands politically, and how a credible process could move both sides toward a legitimate outcome.

For too long, the debate has rewarded certainty more than reflection. Those defending Somali unity can regard any discussion of separation as surrender. Those supporting Somaliland’s independence can interpret any discussion of a future association as betrayal. Between these positions, the space for serious negotiation becomes dangerously narrow. Leaders then speak primarily to their own supporters, using language that strengthens their domestic standing while making an eventual settlement harder to reach.

Yet agreeing to talk does not require either side to abandon its convictions. Somalia’s leaders can defend unity while accepting that its legitimacy depends on consent, justice and credible political arrangements. Somaliland’s leaders can maintain their position on independence while recognising that negotiations with Mogadishu need not invalidate that position. The purpose of dialogue is to examine how deeply opposed claims can be addressed peacefully, with the people affected having a meaningful voice in the outcome.

Historical Foundations and Broken Trust

The history behind those claims deserves more respect than it usually receives in political exchanges. The union of 1960 carried enormous hope. It expressed an aspiration that Somalis emerging from different colonial administrations could build a common political home. For many people, that aspiration still holds emotional and historical significance. Their attachment to unity should not automatically be dismissed as hostility towards Somaliland or indifference to its experiences.

But the history that followed also matters. Northern grievances, political exclusion and the devastating violence inflicted under the military government profoundly damaged confidence in the state. The destruction of Hargeisa and Burao, and the suffering associated with that period, cannot be treated as secondary details in an argument about national identity. They help explain why the union came to mean something very different to many of those who had once embraced it.

Acknowledging that suffering does not assign collective guilt to people elsewhere in Somalia. It establishes an essential distinction between defending a shared future and defending the abuses committed in the name of a shared state. Any credible appeal for renewed unity must make room for truth, remembrance and accountability. People cannot reasonably be asked to recover trust while the experiences that destroyed it are minimized.

What Consent Would Require

This is where the argument about Hargeisa becomes especially important. If unity is to have a future, it must become a proposition that people would freely choose. Shared language, religion and family connections provide strong foundations for human solidarity. They do not, by themselves, answer questions about the distribution of power, protection from abuse, control over institutions or the reliability of constitutional guarantees. A serious unionist position must explain what would make a future arrangement fair, secure and desirable.

Mogadishu would therefore need to move beyond asking why Somaliland should remain part of Somalia and address a harder question: what political offer could persuade people who have lost confidence in the union to reconsider it? That would require substance. How would authority be shared? How would agreements be protected against reversal by a future administration? What institutions would resolve disputes? What guarantees would prevent domination? Without convincing answers, appeals to unity risk remaining expressions of sentiment rather than proposals for government.

Hargeisa faces an equally demanding responsibility. A durable settlement must reflect more than the agreement of political leaders or the strength of a public slogan. It must make room for differing political views and for communities whose preferences cannot simply be presumed. Neither capital should assume that it speaks with one voice for every person whose future would be affected. A process intended to resolve a dispute over consent must practise consent within its own constituencies.

What a Credible Settlement Process Would Require

The same seriousness is needed when considering separation. An agreed separation would involve negotiations over citizenship, movement, property, trade, security, public assets and liabilities, and the treatment of people living across the resulting jurisdictional divide. Questions concerning territory and the wishes of affected communities would demand particular care. These are matters that touch ordinary lives directly. They cannot safely be postponed until after leaders announce that the political question has been settled.

This explains the importance of Mogadishu’s role. Its participation would not, by itself, figure out every international legal or diplomatic question. But a negotiated agreement could reduce uncertainty and provide a framework for managing the relationship peacefully. It would allow both sides to address practical obligations together and seek international support for an agreed process. Even leaders passionately committed to separation have reason to consider the value of such an outcome.

There is already a history of dialogue to build upon. Talks held in Chevening, Dubai and Ankara demonstrated that the two sides could engage despite their incompatible positions. The 2013 Ankara communiqué expressly provided for dialogue between the Federal Government of Somalia and the Government of Somaliland. The task, therefore, is to turn an established possibility into a sustained political process with a clear purpose and reliable follow-through.

A credible process would need an agreed agenda, delegations with sufficient authority, a permanent technical secretariat and a realistic timetable. Political leaders should receive advice from specialists on constitutional arrangements, economics, security and public administration. Women, young people, business representatives, civil society and affected communities should have structured opportunities to contribute. Public communication should explain what has been agreed and what remains unresolved, without forcing every sensitive exchange into immediate public confrontation.

Practical cooperation could help restore confidence while negotiations continue. Trade, movement, public health, drought preparedness and the protection of livelihoods all offer areas where cooperation would produce visible benefits. Families and businesses should not have to wait for a final constitutional settlement before leaders address problems they already share. Such cooperation could also demonstrate whether commitments made at the negotiating table can survive political pressure.

A referendum could eventually form part of the settlement, particularly if negotiations establish that a direct public decision is the most legitimate way forward. It should be approached as a carefully prepared democratic mechanism. Before any vote, the parties would need agreement on its legal basis, the question, voter eligibility, geographic scope, independent administration, security and the consequences of each possible result. Displaced people and communities with competing preferences would require explicit attention. Agreement on how to implement the outcome would be as important as agreement on how to conduct the ballot.

International experience offers lessons, although no example can simply be transferred to the Somali context. The referendum in Southern Sudan, for instance, was provided for in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. That illustrates the importance of placing a vote within a negotiated political framework. A ballot can express a public choice, but it cannot substitute for the arrangements needed to honour that choice peacefully.

Both sides would consequently need to prepare their supporters for the possibility that a credible process might produce an uncomfortable answer. Advocates of unity must be willing to confront the possibility that people may reject the arrangement they favour. Advocates of independence must accept scrutiny of the process through which public consent is established and the safeguards owed to those who disagree. Democratic legitimacy carries obligations before, during and after a decision.

Outside partners can assist through mediation, technical support and guarantees requested by the parties. Their involvement should strengthen Somali ownership of the process. No external capital will live with the consequences as directly as the communities concerned, and no diplomatic opportunity can replace the patient work of building an agreement between them.

The Cost of Delay and the Responsibility of Leadership

The cost of postponement also deserves honest consideration. An unresolved relationship leaves room for recurring confrontation, competing external partnerships and political mobilisation around grievance. It consumes attention that could be devoted to public services, employment, security and resilience. Leaving the question open may feel less politically dangerous to an individual leader, but it transfers the burden to citizens and to the next generation.

The insight I took from Abdishakur’s response is ultimately a challenge to leadership on both sides. Those who want unity must seek willing partners in Hargeisa. Those who want an agreed separation must engage seriously with Mogadishu. Both must recognise the rights and preferences of the people whose lives extend far beyond the language of official statements.

Somalis should be able to discuss these possibilities without questioning one another’s dignity or belonging. A person can favour unity and acknowledge the depth of Somaliland’s grievances. Another can favour independence and recognise the value of a close, cooperative relationship with Somalia. Allowing that political space would make an honest settlement more achievable.

The responsibility of leadership is to create a process capable of producing a legitimate answer. That answer might be a freely accepted form of union, an agreed separation, or an arrangement developed through negotiations that neither side can fully describe today. Whatever its form, it must rest on consent, protect those who disagree and provide a workable relationship for the future. Hargeisa and Mogadishu owe their people the seriousness to begin that conversation and the resolve to carry it through.

Hussien Mohamed Yusuf
Email: [email protected]
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Hussein is a Wardheernews contributor based in Nairobi, Kenya

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