AFC-M23 Captures Two Key Regions in Masisi After Years of FDLR Control

AFC-M23 leaders visited Remeka and even conducted community cleaning with local population

**MASISI, North Kivu **— AFC-M23 forces have captured Remeka and Katoyi (Gatoyi) area of southern Masisi Territory, in a significant shift in a region long associated with the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).

Remeka, also known as Niakabasha, in the Ufamandu 1 groupement of Bahunde Chiefdom, came under AFC-M23 control around August 20–21 after fighting with Congolese army, or FARDC, units and Wazalendo militias.

The advance followed the capture of nearby settlements including Chingete, Katuunda and Miko. Pro-AFC-M23 sources said the operation also disrupted FDLR military infrastructure, including a training facility and command structures. Other local reporting described the fighting primarily as clashes between AFC-M23 and FARDC-Wazalendo forces.

Katoyi, sometimes rendered as Gatoyi, is a separate but strategically connected area. It has changed hands repeatedly since late 2025. AFC-M23 captured it in November 2025 before FARDC and PARECO-Wazalendo forces retook it in December. Further fighting returned control to AFC-M23 around February and March 2026.

The two areas form part of a wider corridor connecting Masisi with Walikale and South Kivu, making control of the territory important for military movement and supply routes.

The region also has a long history of FDLR activity.

The FDLR established a significant presence in parts of Masisi after the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. Remeka became one of the group’s strategic positions, while Gatoyi developed into a broader centre of military, political and economic influence.

In recent testimony, retired Col. Augustin Nshimiyimana “Bora,” a former FDLR external intelligence officer, described Gatoyi as an important base of the group’s influence.

He said an individual known as Mwami Bigembe Turikunkiko had been a hunter in Gatoyi before receiving FDLR military training and later becoming a prominent political figure and traditional chief there. Both are very high-level communal leadership roles in eastern Congo.

Bora also reported that FDLR-linked networks influenced local elections, with politicians from territories under the group’s control expected to represent its interests.

The FDLR has at various times operated alongside Nyatura and other armed groups and fought with forces aligned with Kinshasa against M23.

The latest AFC-M23 advances have also occurred amid significant population movements.

In November 2025, 511 Rwandan nationals, mostly women and children who had lived for years in the Gatoyi-Katoyi and wider Masisi areas, crossed into Rwanda through the Goma-Gisenyi border under UNHCR facilitation.

Rwandan authorities said nearly 6,000 Rwandans returned from eastern Congo during 2025.

The latest fighting, however, has displaced Congolese civilians. Families have fled toward other parts of Ufamandu, Walikale and South Kivu, amid reports of looting and worsening humanitarian conditions.

By August 24–25, the AFC-M23-appointed administrator of Masisi had visited Remeka, participated in community work and launched maintenance of the Ngungu-Remeka road. He called for peaceful coexistence and urged remaining Wazalendo fighters to join AFC-M23.

The advances are part of AFC-M23’s broader campaign, which the movement describes as an effort to neutralize the FDLR and its allied forces.

The developments come despite ongoing diplomatic efforts to end the conflict. Fighting continues, and casualty figures remain unconfirmed. The security situation across southern Masisi remains fluid.