Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe turns more autocratic

Sep. 4, 2023: Zimbabwe’s President Emmerson Mnangagwa inspects the guard of honor at his inauguration in Harare. A recent constitutional amendment will keep him in office until 2030 without an election. © Getty Images

• Mnangagwa has abandoned democratic norms faster than Mugabe did
• A 2026 amendment delays elections, lets parliament pick presidents
• Southern African leaders, mired in domestic trouble, keep praising Harare

The democratic crisis in Zimbabwe under President Emmerson Mnangagwa has proved to be worse than anything experienced during former President Robert Mugabe’s long hold on the country after its liberation from Britain in 1980.

Mr. Mnangagwa ousted Mugabe in November 2017 through a military coup that was clearly an internal ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front) power play. The removal of President Mugabe by Mr. Mnangagwa, in collaboration with the top military brass, violated Zimbabwe’s constitution. Mugabe had been elected democratically – although his successive electoral victories were controversial due to irregularities that were an open secret to observers in the country and abroad. He had been in power for 37 years and was desperately squeezing his liberation credentials to remain at the helm of a country that no longer drew any benefit from his continued presidency.

Among the desperate maneuvers the late Mugabe employed to justify staying in power was his adoption of the infamous land reform policy in 2000, which dispossessed white farmers of their land and redistributed it to black Zimbabweans. This was a bid to rally political support from an increasingly disenchanted black majority that backfired severely and triggered violence in the country. Since then, Zimbabwe’s economy has been on a downward spiral, facing hyperinflation and loss of income for many.

Furthermore, Western sanctions imposed in response to the political violence surrounding the land reform and the country’s broader deviation from democratic principles hampered recovery for two decades. Consequently, widespread job losses made it difficult for the majority of the population to earn a living. The worsening socioeconomic situation has driven Zimbabweans to seek better opportunities outside their country. South Africa has since been host to the largest cohort of Zimbabwean youths fleeing the economic conditions at home.

It is against this backdrop that the unconstitutional removal of Mugabe from power was seen as a possible reprieve, ending 37 years of misrule. Mr. Mnangagwa’s coup drew little condemnation from the international community. There were hopes – evidently misplaced – that his ascent could reset the situation in Zimbabwe, recommit the country to democratic norms by opening the political space for competitive politics and create an opportunity for economic recovery.

The experience under the Mugabe presidency was bleak as he edged towards the fourth decade in office. His administration was showing severe fatigue and was suffering a legitimacy crisis stemming from constant suppression of public discontent coupled with electoral meddling to stay in power longer than voters desired.

When Mr. Mnangagwa deposed Mugabe in the 2017 coup, there was a muted sense of hope that Zimbabwe would turn the corner and gradually shift towards open democracy and reintegration into the international community, after becoming a pariah state under Mugabe. Yet those who observed the power shift up close were concerned that Mr. Mnangagwa was cut from the ZANU-PF cloth – the same leadership fabric that produced and tolerated Mugabe while the country’s economy and productivity declined significantly. The concern proved valid: President Mnangagwa has indeed been even worse than Mugabe, despite having observed the disaster that unfolded under Mugabe and presenting himself as the solution.

A faster slide into dictatorship

Mugabe’s rule was brutal from early on, most notoriously in the Gukurahundi massacres in the 1980s, when Mr. Mnangagwa was his state security minister. But it took two decades in power before the president openly turned against the democratic process. His most controversial policy decision, the violent fast-track land reform program, came in 2000, exactly 20 years after he became the country’s first democratically elected leader.

Mr. Mnangagwa as president, by contrast, has raced toward dictatorship, openly adopting even harsher anti-democratic practices in less than a decade since he took over. In July 2026, he signed a constitutional amendment extending presidential and parliamentary terms from five to seven years, keeping him in office until 2030 and effectively postponing elections that were scheduled to be held in 2028. The amendment also scraps direct presidential elections: Future presidents will be chosen by parliament. Critics in Zimbabwe have dubbed this a constitutional coup.

March 5, 1980: Prime Minister of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe (1924-2019) holding a press conference following his election victory. © Getty Images

Unlike Mugabe, who faced allegations of doctoring elections, President Mnangagwa has shown little interest in even the pretense of adhering to routine democratic practices, such as holding elections. Even before the passing of the constitutional amendment to postpone elections, reports from Zimbabwe had been pointing to Mr. Mnangagwa’s clampdown on opposition politicians and a crackdown on independent media. The only view allowed to come out of Zimbabwe regarding the state of the nation is the government-sanctioned narrative that the country’s economy is recovering under the leadership of President Mnangagwa and his ZANU-PF comrades. There are also reports of recovery in the agriculture sector. This picture, however, does not square with the reality of economic desperation.

A muted global voice

The question is how President Mnangagwa is able to get away with what is happening in Zimbabwe, when the lived experience of the majority of citizens is as clear as day. Of particular concern is the lack of indignation from the international community and regional leaders over the ongoing leadership and political crisis in Zimbabwe. It is difficult to discern any defensible agenda that would justify extending ZANU-PF’s leadership, let alone postponing the 2028 elections. Zimbabwe has become more corrupt since Mugabe was removed. Yet regional leaders, including South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa, have recently visited Zimbabwe and spoken loudly about the supposed achievements of its current leadership.

When it comes to setting Zimbabwe on a democratic path and toward possible economic recovery, President Mnangagwa is not only moving the goalposts, he is tearing them down altogether. He is counting on the ongoing global fragmentation that has made it difficult for the international community to speak with one voice. He is well aware of the region’s troubled democracies, where political leaders are too preoccupied with their own domestic survival to weigh in on the crisis in Zimbabwe. The net effect borders on the rest of the world tacitly condoning what is unfolding in Zimbabwe under Mnangagwa and the ZANU-PF cohort.

Events and conflicts unfolding in the Middle East, Ukraine, Venezuela and Cuba appear disjointed and autonomous from one another. The global community is focused on such issues because they have deeper implications for the changing and uncertain global geopolitical map. Western powers are heavily invested in those developments due to their immediate impact on the global economy and, subsequently, on their own economies. For example, the war in Iran has direct domestic implications for many countries across the globe and may even threaten some countries’ democratic stability.

In this context, a crisis unfolding in Zimbabwe is an insignificant issue with barely any implications for the geopolitical map. This partially explains the international indifference to developments in the country. While global attention may be drawn to ongoing conflicts, this does not explain why leaders in the Southern African Development Community are also showing little interest in Zimbabwe’s sharp turn toward undemocratic practices.

Regional quiet

President Ramaphosa’s latest visit, in May 2026, took place before Zimbabwe’s parliament passed the constitutional amendment. Nevertheless, the bill was already the subject of heated public debate, and President Mnangagwa’s administration was under scrutiny for restricting the political space, including by throttling independent media. Instead of highlighting these issues, Mr. Ramaphosa spoke about impressive progress achieved by Zimbabwe in turning the economy around, particularly the agricultural sector. Although the visit occurred amid ongoing anti-immigration protests in which Zimbabwean immigrants were among those targeted in South Africa, he did not mention anything about the need for Zimbabwe to strengthen its democracy and build an economy that would stem the mass exodus of the country’s labor force.

Before Mr. Ramaphosa’s visit, Botswana’s President Duma Boko had made a state visit to Zimbabwe in April 2026. Mr. Boko spoke about strengthening relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana and the strong solidarity between the two countries. He, too, shied away from the political crisis in Zimbabwe. Both Presidents Ramaphosa and Boko have their own domestic problems to address: economic hardship, restless youth and crises in the respective public health sectors. In October 2025, Zimbabwe had to assist Botswana with an emergency consignment of antiretroviral medicine. The situation is a far cry from Botswana under former President Ian Khama, who often called out Zimbabwe for deviating from democratic practices.

Scenarios

Likely: Entrenchment and regional silence

Zimbabwe’s political crisis will continue to escalate unless an internal leadership contest emerges within the ruling ZANU-PF, which may remove Mr. Mnangagwa before his term comes to an end in 2030. This also means that a meaningful economic recovery is not in sight. The extension of his tenure and the postponement of the 2028 elections will necessitate a further clampdown on political dialogue, leading to harsher measures to manage possible dissent.

The Zimbabwean migration crisis will linger, and South Africa will continue to shoulder the burden. Regional leaders battling their own domestic challenges will continue to look away as Zimbabwe falters further. The international community will remain drawn to global crises and conflicts in the medium term. The political and economic crises in Zimbabwe will remain footnotes − insignificant ones − on the uncertain and changing global geopolitical map.

Unlikely: Courts or party rebels restore 2028 vote

The constitutional amendment extending Mr. Mnangagwa’s presidential tenure to 2030 will be struck down by the Constitutional Court, which is hearing challenges arguing that the changes required a referendum. This will compel President Mnangagwa to reinstate the 2028 elections, which may weaken ZANU-PF’s domination of the country.

Alternatively, or in addition, a mutiny within ZANU-PF will push him to reconsider extending his tenure to 2030, and, although the party will emerge weakened and will have to work with the opposition, a different leader will emerge to take it into the 2028 elections. This will culminate in deeper constitutional reform allowing for competitive politics, which will pave the way for economic reforms.