Tunisia: What has Kais Saied achieved economically in seven years?

In 2018, he paid about 35 Tunisian dinars ($13) for engine oil. Today, the same purchase can cost close to 100 dinars ($34). To maintain his income, he has had to work longer hours, spending more of his day behind the wheel to cover rising operating costs.

His experience points to a broader question facing Tunisia nearly seven years into Kais Saied’s presidency: What has changed in the economy, and how much of that change has improved people’s lives?

Saied came to power amid widespread frustration with the political establishment, promising a fairer and more accountable state. Since then, Tunisia has faced the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, volatile global food and energy prices, and geopolitical turmoil.

These shocks have complicated the country’s recovery, but they do not settle the question of how effectively the government has responded. The economy continues to grow, and overall unemployment has eased from its pandemic-era peak. Yet food prices remain a burden, unemployment among young people is high, and public finances leave the government with limited room to manoeuvre.

For Tunisians such as Oueslati, what matters most is not the headline growth figure but whether their earnings cover the cost of living.

The price of the engine oil Oueslati buys has increased by approximately 186%, according to figures he provided to Al Jazeera. For a taxi driver, this is not an isolated expense but part of the cost of staying in business.

The pressure extends well beyond transport.

Tunisia’s annual inflation rate reached 5.6% in September 2026, up from 5.4% in August and 4.8% in January, according to the National Institute of Statistics.

Food and beverage prices rose by 8.4% year on year. Poultry prices increased by 16.5%, fruit by 16.3% and lamb by 14.6%. Core inflation, which excludes food and energy, stood at 4.9%.

Economist Ridha Chkoundali argues that the cumulative effect of price increases is central to understanding the pressure on Tunisian families.

According to his estimates, average annual inflation was 6.8% between 2015 and 2021, compared with 8.1% between 2021 and 2026, indicating stronger inflationary pressures in the latter period.

The government has taken steps to ease the financial pressure. The Central Bank cut its key interest rate twice in 2025, bringing it down to 7%. But lower borrowing costs cannot, alone, restore purchasing power eroded by higher prices.

Chkoundali also argues that tighter access to credit has left consumers with fewer ways to manage expenses. Loans, banking facilities and cheques once allowed some households to spread payments over time, he says. Changes in financing conditions and cheque regulations have narrowed those options.

For families with little savings, essentials now consume more of the household budget, while access to short-term financial support may be more limited.

The challenge is not simply to bring inflation down, but to make everyday life more affordable and give households a chance to rebuild their financial security.

Tunisia’s economy grew by 2.3% year on year in the second quarter of 2026, according to the National Institute of Statistics. Growth reached 1.4% compared with the previous quarter.

The 2026 Finance Law had projected annual growth of about 3.3%, setting a more ambitious benchmark for the year.

For Chkoundali, the gap between the budget projection and the quarterly figures highlights a deeper problem: Growth matters to households only when it translates into greater production, investment, employment and income.

The labour market illustrates the challenge.

Tunisia’s overall unemployment rate stood at 14.9% in the second quarter of 2026, down from 15.3% in the same period a year earlier. It had reached 17% in 2020, according to the National Institute of Statistics.

But the headline rate conceals a harsher reality for younger Tunisians. Unemployment among people aged 15 to 24 reached 35.4%, while the rate among university graduates stood at 26.6%.

For many young people, the obstacle is not simply finding work. It is finding a job that offers reliable income, stability and a path towards independence.

If economic expansion fails to create enough productive jobs, its benefits will remain limited for large sections of the population.

Chkoundali identifies weak investment and declining production as major constraints. He also warns that the government’s reliance on domestic borrowing could make it harder for private businesses to obtain financing, expand and hire.

According to figures he cited, domestic borrowing amounted to about 7 billion dinars ($2.3bn) in both 2024 and 2025, with 11 billion dinars ($3.7bn) in borrowing at the beginning of 2026.

The concern is that the state’s financing needs could compete with private businesses for available credit. Domestic borrowing does not automatically undermine growth; its effects depend on the terms of financing and how the money is spent. But if businesses struggle to secure funds for investment, the consequences can be felt in production and employment.

Tunisia faces a difficult balancing act: financing the state’s obligations while creating conditions for private enterprise to grow and provide jobs.

For workers such as Oueslati, the consequences are immediate. When operating costs rise but earnings do not keep pace, longer hours can become a way of standing still rather than moving ahead.

Saied has made combating monopolies and speculation a central part of his economic agenda, presenting the campaign as a way to protect consumers, curb abusive practices and advance social justice.

The objective speaks to public frustration over rising prices. But critics argue that the authorities have not always adequately distinguished between speculative stockpiling and the storage necessary to keep essential goods available.

Warehousing, inventory management and distribution are integral to functioning supply chains. Restrictions that disrupt these systems without providing alternatives can, critics warn, contribute to shortages rather than bring prices down.

The risk is particularly significant in markets that depend on imports and distribution networks operated by private companies and public-sector entities. When stocks run low or supply channels are disrupted, goods can become harder to find even when government intervention is intended to protect consumers.

Enforcement may be necessary to tackle abusive practices, but it cannot replace the infrastructure and commercial systems needed to keep goods moving.

Protecting consumers therefore requires more than confronting speculation. It also requires policies that preserve reliable supplies, support production and ensure essential goods reach the market.

In a statement, the Democratic Current party criticised what it described as a refusal to confront economic realities, arguing that attributing failures to conspiracies would deepen the country’s problems rather than resolve them.

The government’s interventions must ultimately be judged by their results. A policy designed to protect consumers must be assessed not only by its stated purpose, but also by its effects on prices and availability of goods.

The government faces another constraint in its efforts to support economic activity and shield households from rising costs: The burden of financing the state.

Tunisia’s public debt rose from 67.8% of gross domestic product in 2019 to 84.9% in 2024, before falling to 82.1% in 2025, according to Finance Ministry data. The 2026 Finance Law projects a ratio of approximately 83.4%.

Debt levels alone do not determine whether public finances are sustainable. Borrowing costs, repayment schedules, government revenue and economic growth also matter. But substantial financing needs can leave the state with less flexibility to respond to new shocks.

Chkoundali argues that the state’s financing needs have narrowed its options. The question is not simply how much the government borrows, but whether its financing choices leave enough resources for productive investment.

That pressure becomes more acute when international energy prices rise.

Tunisia’s 2026 Finance Law assumed a Brent crude price of about $63.30 per barrel. By the end of June, the average price had reached approximately $92.60, according to figures cited in the report.

The increase raised the potential cost of energy imports and fuel subsidies, putting additional pressure on public finances.

Fuel subsidies amounted to 2.427 billion dinars in the first half of 2026, equivalent to $826m. That represented 48.6% of the allocation for fuel subsidies under the Finance Law.

Public investment expenditure over the same period totalled 1.665 billion dinars, or approximately $566.6m.

The figures show how the government must balance competing demands on the budget. Subsidies shield consumers from some of the immediate effects of higher energy prices. But when oil costs more than expected, maintaining that protection becomes more expensive, potentially leaving fewer resources for public investment.

Cutting subsidies too abruptly could transfer more of the burden to households and businesses. Maintaining them, meanwhile, can intensify fiscal pressure when international prices rise sharply.

The consequences may extend beyond government spending. A larger energy import bill increases demand for foreign currency and may put pressure on the dinar and foreign-exchange reserves, particularly if export earnings and domestic production fail to offset the additional costs.

Chkoundali also points to trade imbalances involving partners including Algeria and Egypt as part of the wider external challenge.

He argues that policymakers should prepare multiple scenarios when estimating financing needs and subsidy costs, rather than rely on a single oil-price forecast. Such planning could help the government anticipate market changes before they place unexpected strain on the budget.

For Tunisia, the challenge is to shield households from external shocks without undermining the investment needed to make the economy more productive and less vulnerable to them.

Saied’s supporters argue that his economic record cannot be assessed without considering the problems that preceded his presidency.

Houssam Ben Ahmed, a political activist who supports the president, says Saied inherited a country already in serious decline across several sectors. He describes the measures taken on July 25, 2021 as “an absolute necessity to save the state”, citing what he sees as the fragmentation and deterioration of political and economic life.

From this perspective, the disruption that followed was part of a confrontation with longstanding problems, rather than evidence that Saied’s policies alone were responsible for the country’s difficulties.

But inherited problems and external shocks do not remove the need to examine the decisions made in office. They form part of the context against which the government’s choices and results must be judged.

Has the government improved conditions for investment? Has it strengthened domestic production, created jobs and protected living standards? And where improvements have occurred, have they been sufficient to meet public expectations?

Supporters emphasise the difficulties Saied inherited. Critics point to persistent pressure on household budgets and limited opportunities for young people. A meaningful assessment must look beyond both claims to the evidence: What has improved, what has deteriorated and how much can reasonably be attributed to government policy?

Nearly seven years into Saied’s presidency, Tunisia’s economic record remains mixed. The economy continues to grow, and overall unemployment has eased from its pandemic-era peak. Yet food prices remain high, joblessness among young people persists, and public finances face competing demands.

External shocks have made recovery harder. But enduring a crisis is not the same as emerging from it. An economy can weather successive shocks without delivering the improvements in income, employment and security that people expect.

A more convincing recovery would mean stronger productive investment, more stable jobs, higher domestic production and incomes that keep pace with the cost of living. It would also require the government to manage its financing needs without sacrificing the investment on which future growth depends.

For Oueslati, the debate comes down to the cost of keeping his taxi on the road. Every increase in operating expenses eats into his earnings. Every additional hour behind the wheel is time spent trying to make up the difference.

One driver’s experience cannot determine the success or failure of an entire economic programme. But it highlights what national statistics can obscure: Whether people can turn their work into a more secure standard of living.

For Oueslati, progress would mean being able to keep his taxi on the road without having to work ever longer hours simply to make ends meet.