JOHANNESBURG, Gauteng — As South Africa gears up for the 2026 municipal polls, the nation’s political landscape is undergoing a fundamental transformation that extends far beyond temporary electoral adjustments. According to Angelo Fick, Research Director at the Auwal Socio-Economic Research Institute, the rise of coalition politics is no longer a mere possibility but a governing reality that is permanently reshaping how South Africans engage with democracy.
The 2024 national election fundamentally changed the country’s political arithmetic, culminating in the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU). However, the critical question moving forward is whether this represents a temporary political arrangement or the beginning of a permanent realignment. The true test lies in whether South Africans are increasingly willing to divide their votes, ultimately drawing a completely new political map.
The Decline of Dominant Parties and the Rise of the Fringe
While the largest political parties may hope this fragmentation is merely a blip on the radar, the data suggests a deeper structural shift. The African National Congress (ANC) has experienced a steady decline in its share of the vote, while the Democratic Alliance (DA) has largely held steady at around the 20% mark. Concurrently, a proliferation of smaller parties is taking incremental bites out of traditional electoral support, broadening representation in legislatures across the country.
Unlike the relatively stable coalitions seen in Cape Town in 2009 or eThekwini, many of today’s multiparty coalitions have become increasingly unwieldy. Fick identifies multiple drivers behind this phenomenon:
Demographic Shifts:
A growing majority of South Africans are now younger than the democratic dispensation itself, meaning traditional loyalty to liberation movements or old liberal traditions is not growing as it once did.
“Factory Fault” Parties:
New formations continue to splinter from main parties, following the historical precedents of COPE in the 2000s, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) in the 2010s, and the MK party and ATM in the 2020s.
Ethno-nationalist and Communitarian Movements:
There is a notable rise in parties appealing to specific ethnic or geographically defined communities, such as the Coloured People’s Movement, the Patriotic Alliance, the Freedom Front, and the MK party’s strongholds in KwaZulu-Natal. This marks a shift from earlier, less successful attempts by groups like the Minority Front or the New National Party to gain local traction.
Organizational Decay and the Crisis of Local Governance
The downsizing of organizational capacity among legacy parties has also accelerated this realignment. While the ANC’s decline is partly rooted in its poor governance record and allegations of corruption, it is equally tied to a failure to adapt to modern communication methods. Older political structures have not sufficiently evolved to engage young voters, who are poised to inherit the country but remain underrepresented in formal politics.
This fragmentation has starkly different effects at different levels of government. While the national GNU has demonstrated relative stability through a common program, local government coalitions have been plagued by instability. This instability is frequently driven by small parties holding larger coalitions to ransom, coupled with the incompetence, self-enrichment, and self-aggrandizement of certain politicians. The City of Johannesburg stands as a prime example: once the wealthiest city with the largest budget on the continent, it has been reduced to a bankrupt municipality struggling with debt, unpaid creditors, and severe service delivery and infrastructure failures over the last decade—a situation for which the ANC bears massive responsibility, but coalition dynamics have exacerbated.
The Push for Electoral Reform and Accountability
The disproportionate influence of minor parties has sparked debates about curtailing their power. However, Fick warns against simply returning power to larger parties that voters have already rejected. The core issue is that proportional representation must not contradict the expressed will of the electorate.
A glaring example of this dysfunction occurred in Johannesburg, where two consecutive mayors were elected from a party holding only three of 270 council seats. Such internal party compromises, which allow manipulative minority rule, serve neither the small party nor the electorate.
To resolve this, Fick advocates for a “happy medium” through targeted electoral reform. Researchers and public affairs advocates are pushing for legislation that establishes a minimum threshold: while a party may gain legislative representation, a higher percentage of electorate support should be required to secure executive positions. This would prevent scenarios where small parties bully larger ones into rewarding obedience with executive posts, or hold national governance to ransom, as seen in recent disputes involving the Minister of Arts, Sports and Culture over national policy regarding the state of Palestine.
Looking Toward 2029
Ultimately, South Africa is in the midst of a necessary, albeit painful, process of electoral reform. Fick emphasizes that it is up to citizens to hold their political organizations accountable. This requires active engagement beyond the ballot box, including fighting maladministration within party structures and demanding the deployment of competent leaders.
As the country moves toward the next major electoral cycle, South Africans must remain engaged in the reform process through 2029. The goal is to ensure that elected representatives remain transparent in how they negotiate coalitions and conduct themselves in office, guaranteeing that political deals serve the residents of towns and cities, rather than the politicians and their handlers who make them.
